Abstract Application source code protection is a major with hardware safeguards and encryption mechanisms, enconcern for software architects today. Secure tire piece of software on a TCB guarantees its IP privacy
nately, these capabilities incur a sizeable performance over-fortunately, whole-application encryption can inhibit the head. Partitioning an application into secure and insecure use of shared libraries, complicate upgrades and patches, regions can help diminish these overheads but invalidates and most importantly, require the use of cryptographic reguarantees of code secrecy and copy protection. This work examines one of the problems of partitioning an sources throughout all of software execution incurring a application into public and private regions, the ability of an sizable performance and power usage penalty. Since (IP) protection to guard trade-functionality of IP sensitive partitions by simply observing secret algorithms from theft, enforce licensing agreements, the execution of the remainder of the code, the IP protecand to prevent application vandalism caused by viruses and tion is wholly invalidated. Therefore, this paper's analysis Trojan horses. However, the scale with which the Internet of this kind of software vulnerability is of great importance facilitates piracy and application "cracking" has now made to guarantee the security of partitioned applications. IP protection a first order concern. Consequently, a numIn Section II, we put forth a simple adversarial model. ber of software protection techniques have arisen, primar-Section III defines what a Memoization Attack is, and ily based on hiding application functionality, but without shows that it is the "best" possible attack an adversary can strict security guarantees. mount given our model. Section IV describes one practi-
In this work we investigate state-of-the-art security sys-cal and efficient implementation of this attack, and Section tems that protect applications by partitioning code into V describes when the attack can be effective. Using these public and private regions of execution [27] [49] . Specif-insights, Section VI proposes heuristic metrics that can be ically, we analyze one of the most basic methods for an used to identify whether a partitioned region of applicaadversary to determine the functionality of hidden applica-tion code is susceptible to an Memoization Attack. Section tion code, a "Memoization Attack." We have implemented VII discusses other work in this area and Section VIII cona Memoization Attack, run it against a number of applica-cludes. tions, and developed methods of identifying when an arbi-I. ATTACK MODEL trary application might be vulnerable to such an attack.
Naively, a secure computing system can perfectly pro-
In this work, we restrict our focus to one of the simplest tect application IP by executing all software on an im-types of adversary imaginable. As will be described in Secpenetrable Trusted Computing Base (TCB), where only tion II-D, our adversary can only observe the execution of the final application results are observable. To practi-a partitioned application and then attempt to reconstruct cally achieve this one could modify a standard processor the hidden regions that are run on a TCB using that observation. More sophisticated adversaries are easy to envision, tThis work is generously supported by ITRI, Taiwan.
however, we feel it prudent to explore a very basic model . AEGIS secure architecture [49] because of its fairly straight-, | -0P) forward protocol for the execution of partitioned applicaObservable tions. The remainder of this paper and all of our experiMemory Buses ments assume this model for a TCB.
In the AEGIS secure architecture a partitioned applica- tion is merely a combination of private encrypted regions control flow, the processor state can be examined cycleand public unencrypted regions of code that switch back by-cycle, and all memory requests and responses can be and forth during execution using two distinct processor sniffed. modes. Application memory is also separated into enAt the end of box I the procedure calls a private region of crypted and unencrypted regions, conceptually forming pri-code (box II) and transfers control to the TCB to execute vate and public divisions of data and code. The encrypted that private procedure. This call requires procedure arguportions of code can only run in a secure mode that de-ments to be passed to the TCB, as shown by the registers crypts instructions, executes them, and protects the secrecy "r1," etc. in Fig. 1 (as defined by the application binary and integrity of any private data these instructions operate interface and including the stack and frame pointers). Simon. While executing in this mode an adversary can only ob-ilarly, once the procedure completes, a return value is also serve accesses to public data, and cannot observe or modify passed back from the TCB to the conventional processor. private data or program execution. Unencrypted portions Since the private procedure was encrypted, an adversary of a partitioned application run in an insecure mode, with cannot inspect the code directly to determine its control no protection of the data the instructions operate on.
flow, nor can it examine the processor state cycle-by-cycle
For simplicity, we assume that procedures and the data since its a TCB. Further, this TCB model hides any acstructures they "own" are the fundamental units of public cesses to its private memory stack that the private proceand private division. We also assume that procedures do dure makes. not maintain state across calls within encrypted regions of Therefore, the only information an adversary can observe memory. Disallowing a procedure to maintain encrypted relating to the private code is the arguments passed into state between calls allows for a more clean analysis and the procedure, the return value passed back from the prois fairly realistic for a large number of procedures within cedure, and any accesses to public memory that the private applications procedure makes (since public memory requests cannot be hidden by the TCB and the values within public memory B. What an Adversary Can Observe are unencrypted). All three of these can be described as Fig. 1 depicts a fragment of a partitioned application a collection of Address/Value (AV) pairs, where the "Adwhile it is run on an AEGIS secure architecture. Progress-dress" indicates a memory address or argument register ing downward is an execution trace of an application as identifier, and the "Value" is the actual data being acit switches from a public region of code to a private re-cessed. Once the private procedure returns to execution gion and back. To reduce clutter, we only show reads and of public code (box III), the adversary can again observe writes to main memory and do not show any other machine everything.
operations (such as add, etc.).
C Ad Beginning in box I a public region of code executes and performs some arbitrary procedure. Note that, this being Principally, IP secrecy and copy protection depends on a public procedure, all accesses to memory can only touch preventing an adversary from discovering the contents of a regions of memory that are also public. Since this is un-partitioned application's private code. However, it is critiencrypted code executing on a conventional processor, an cal to note that an adversary does not need to excactly deadversary can inspect everything involved with the proce-termine the contents of a private region of code, but must dure. The procedure itself can be read to determine its only reproduce a private procedure 's effect on the system single "Interaction Table. " At some point the adversary D. Adversarial Powers stops executing the authentic application on the TCB and constructs replacement private procedures using the interUnfortunately, any realistic adversary we try to model action table that was captured. He can then continue to involves a human who has some innate prior knowledge execute the application using these counterfeit private proabout the application under attack that can make the pro-cedures. Whenever a counterfeit procedure is called, the set cess of recreating a hidden region of code trivial. For all we of inputs A are read, and the interaction table is searched know, the adversary may even be the author of the original for a match. If a match is found the counterfeit procedure source code for a private procedures.
returns the corresponding output set ib, emulating the proGiven the inability to formally capture such knowledge, cedure, and continues execution of the application. Otherwe will simply treat a private procedure as a mathematical wise the application fails and terminates. The application function with inputs and outputs the adversary is capable continues running as long as calls to the counterfeit proof observing. Our adversary has no understanding of the cedure are completed correctly, agreeing with our previous purpose of a private procedure and can only obtain knowl-definition of failure under T-AOE.
edge of the code's functionality by observing the procedure To determine just how powerful this attack can be, let us arguments, the public memory accesses, and the procedure first assume there exists an adversary with infinite memoutput of an authentic application run on a TCB. Note, ory and computational power, but who must also abide by although it seems probable for a real-world attack, our ad-the restrictions on adversarial powers discussed in Section NY 20-22 June 2007 II. Note, while this adversary may have infinite general of success when guessing, but algorithmic effort to increase purpose computational power, we assume that he cannot this probability likely exhibits diminishing returns. That decrypt private procedures and is restricted to the use of a is, it is our intuition that the computation time required to real TCB to run authentic applications. Therefore what an approximate the output distribution grows exponentially adversary can observe from the execution of an authentic as a function of this approximation's accuracy. application remains the same as in a Memoization Attack since this is essentially defined by our model (although with IV. IMPLEMENTING MEMOIZATION infinite memory this adversary can save everything). Our
To investigate the feasibility of a Memoization Attack, question is then: can this omnipotent adversary mount a we implemented a tool that is capable of observing the exedifferent type of attack that can outperform a Memoization cution of a partitioned application, constructing an interacAttack (that is, have a longer w value for T-AOE).
tion table, replacing all private procedures with counterfeit Now let us assume that this adversary observes L calls procedures, and re-running the partitioned application on to an authentic private procedure, somehow creates and in-alternate inputs. Although building such a tool may sound serts his own counterfeit procedure, and continues running easy, a naive implementation (as will be first described) the application. No matter how the counterfeit procedure would run quite slowly, and require orders of magnitude is constructed, when the counterfeit procedure is called more storage than typically found on computer workstaduring emulation only one of two things can happen. If tions. Therefore, we present here some of the tactics used the exact set of inputs A had been seen during the obser-to streamline the implementation so that it can be executed vation phase, then the adversary can simply return the set efficiently. of corresponding outputs ib that it had saved. However, if {A, is also the best attack possible.
X-read(B) InputSet-0 / V Note, we do not consider adversaries with knowledge of X:riea (C,) tA,B/,,C a non-uniform output distribution of a private procedure.
These adversaries may be able to increase their probability Fig. 3 . At call-time, inputs unknown due to self-determination. Table   Oxfff4 OxffcO Addresds to
The method for creating an interaction 
an extremely deep and repetitive tree, even when the same Next, the is-equal() procedure in read-dict.c was memory addresses and values are being read over and over. made private and observed the application when run on Further, often multiple calls to a private procedure that the standard dictionary file and the input file "smred. in" differ in their initial arguments can later exhibit identical taken from MinneSPEC [41] . This procedure is only called input and output traces for long periods of time. For exam-while Parser reads the dictionary file. In our attack, we ple, a procedure that takes two input arguments, computes were able to correctly emulate this procedure when executmany values using the first argument, but only uses the ing the entire Parser application on much larger input files second argument at the very end of the procedure. When mdred. in and lgred. in. Both attacks proved successful. using a tree data structure this would create two separate, Further, Table I shows that the storage requirements for but nearly identical branches from the root. To construct the interaction table (or actually graph, cf. Section IV-D) the graph data structure useful for emulation, we use a are not large at all. unique-numbering method that pinpoints divergences and convergences of execution traces. More details are given in authentic application run on any large set of The first class of partitioned applications we found to be inputs, hoping to "cover" or "saturate" the set of inputs susceptible to a Memoization Attack are those with private to the inner procedure. Because these "saturating" proceprocedures that are called when the exact same inputs are dures are often not immediately apparent (unlike, perhaps, given to a single execution of an application over and over those mentioned in Section V-A) this class of applications (such as a repeated common function like "save"), or those represents a significant problem for a software architecture that have private procedures that are only ever called when who would like to prevent Memoization Attacks. the application reads identical inputs on every execution
To test whether a Memoization Attack would succeed (such as fixed runtime flags or a common data set).
on this class of applications we attempted to emulate a To illustrate this class, we examined the "Parser" appli-few procedures from the Gzip and Parser applications in cation found in the SPEC CPU2000 suite, and assumed a the SPEC CPU2000 suite, assuming a partitioning scheme partitioning scheme that only treats individual procedures that only treats individual procedures as private or public. as private or public. Parser executes in two stages, first Table II summarizes the results. it processes a fixed dictionary file, and second it analyzes
In our attack of Gzip, we attempt to emulate a number sentences for their grammatic structure using that dictio-of procedures using the input file ref . log after observing nary. During the analysis, it can also accept special direc-the execution of Gzip on just the ref .random input file, tives from a user that perform standard, repeatable oper-both the ref random and ref . graphic input files, and so ations. These two traits (two stage execution and special on. Even though there is virtually no overlap between these directives) are indicative of an application with partially inputs, we found that the bi-reverse 0 procedure can be repeated input sets. emulated almost entirely correctly. Of the 1, 797 calls made To test whether a Memoization Attack would succeed, we to bi-reverse () while processing ref . log, 1, 741 of the designated the special-command() procedure in main. c to calls contained the exact same procedure inputs as had be private. We then observed the application while sending been observed when running Gzip on the first four input the !echo directive (that sets whether to display output to files. the screen) which uses the special_command() procedure.
Similarly, our attack on Parser attempted to emuParser was then run on new input data and we were able late a number of procedures using the the mdred. in and to emulate the call the !echo without any problems. application using the lgred. in input file. Although none (AV pairs) by the rest of its application. A simple way to of the procedures could be fully emulated after memoiz-detect this is to run an application using successively more ing input/output relationships pairs from igred. in, it is inputs, and observe whether the number of distinct inputs clear that there are still many duplicated procedure calls fed to a procedure is linearly related to the number of inbetween the two unrelated input files. It might even be pos-puts fed to the application, or if the number of distinct sible for an adversary to fully emulate the contains-one () inputs fed to that procedure saturates at some level. Proprocedure if he simply observes a large enough set of ap-cedures that are input saturating are likely easy to emulate plication inputs from an input file. through a Memoization Attack (assuming a correlation beFrom this experimentation we see that a Memoization tween the number of unique input AV pairs and the total Attack may be able to succeed even when application in-number of ordered sets of input AV pairs in reality this puts seen during emulation are completely unrelated to ap-correlates well, but not 100% of the time).
plication inputs recorded during observations.
Many techniques exist that can estimate the number of unique input AV pairs given to a procedure, however, we VI. IDENTIFYING VULNERABLE APPLICATIONS simply created a tool that counts and efficiently stores this
In Section V we have shown that a Memoization Attack number while an application is run on a specific input set.
can succeed on certain c s oGiven a large enough input set, this method quickly sepacan succeed on certain classes Of applications. This may be useful information for an attacker however we would rates input saturating procedures from those that are not.
De~~~~~~~~~~~~~Aastu casemalo exapl we usedKr thiser too toidntfyinu rather help software architects avoid such attacks through As a case example we used this tool to identify input their choice of what procedures to make private and what saturating procedures in the SPEC CPU2000 application procedures to make public.
Gzip. Fig. 7 plots the number of unique AV pairs that are Ideally, we would like to have some test that tells us fed to the Gzip procedure ct-tally() during Gzip's execuwhether a particular private procedure can be easily emu-tion on five large, orthogonal input sets. For normalization lated via a Memoization Attack. The simplest test could purposes, the x-axis represents the number of calls made to be to just run our a Memoization Attack on that proce-the procedure instead of time. We call this a "cumulative dure. However, to run this attack on all procedures in an input density" plot, and use it as a helpful visualization of application would be computationally infeasible. Instead, when a procedure might be input saturating.
information theoretic analyses could be applied, but these
In Fig. 7 , we see that the rate of increase in the number might also prove ineffective for practical applications be-of unique AV pairs decreases as more input sets are applied. cause of their assumptions on entropy, complexity, input In fact, the input set ref log did not cause any new AV space, and "learnability" may be too general. [12] [53] [54].
Thus, we propose the use of two heuristics, or "indica- Our first test, Input Saturation tracks whether a private Number ofprocedure calls Fig. 7 . Cumulative input density plot of unique AV pairs for Gzip's procedure iS only ever fed a finite number of distinct inputs ct_tally, when run on a large input set. Table III also shows the average input delta pairs to be fed to the procedure, implying that an adversary and saturation weight values of the Gzip ct_tally(0 promight be able to emulate ct-tally() on ref .log given the cedure using the larger version of the input set. Over observation of the prior four input sets.
the smaller input set, this larger input set causes a drasTo numerically quantify the information in the cumu-tic decrease in SW from 0.87 to 0.77, lowering it to levlative input density plot we can use two specific metrics. els near huft_build() (0.72). However, huft_build() First, the "average input delta" (Avg.IA%) can tell us the shows very little susceptibility to a Memoization Attack percentage increase in the number of unique AV pairs input and ct_tally(0 shows very high susceptibility (as mento a procedure from call to call. This gives an estimate of tioned earlier, no new inputs are seen when the input set how many procedure calls are expected before a new input ref .log is applied). This underscores the need for multiis seen, and correlates exactly to w in the formulation of ple metrics and a conservative interpretation when making T-AOE in Section 1I-C. Second, the "saturation weight" final security decisions. Looking closer at our example, we've run Gzip on a than input saturation since it indicates how important a smaller version of the same inputs and highlighted five of private procedure is to the entire application. its procedures to demonstrate different levels of input satSince an adversary only cares about whole-application uration typical in applications. Fig. 8 shows a cumulative functionality, partitioning an application by making less input density plot for these procedures executing on the five important procedures private may lead to a more successinputs (normalizing total calls and inputs between proce-ful Memoization Attack. For example, assume during a dures to make comparison easier), and Table III gives their memoization attack that an adversary cannot return the average input delta and saturation weight values.
correct outputs for a private procedure call but continues Inspecting the plots in Fig. 8 , we see that the two running. If the previous values in memory still produce the ct-tally() and bi-reverse () procedures are probably in-correct behavior (because of range checks, etc.) then the 13,010 that the outputs of the application as a whole will depend significantly on the outputs of inflate-codes () and adversary will still be content. This "low importance" of ct_tally 0. Alternately, the outputs of the bi reverse 0, the outputs of the private procedure has allowed a Mem-huft-buildo, build-tree(), and longest-natch() prooization Attack to succeed. Another good example arises cedures only produce a limited number of unique output when a private procedure's outputs are only ever used by AV pairs, and these outputs are passed to procedures that a single, simple public procedure that is itself easily emu-do not produce many more unique outputs. Therefore, it lated. In this case, the inputs and outputs of the private might be easy for an adversary to perform a Memoization procedure do not matter, and a Memoization Attack can function on these latter four procedures succeed by simply emulating the simple public procedure wrapping the private procedure. The output weighting of C. Interpreting Indicators a private procedure should be able to identify both cases Unfortunately, it has been proven that cryptographically As with input saturation, the output weight of a proce-secure obfuscation is generally impossible for a large famdure can be estimated using many techniques. However, ily of functions [4] (although a few specific families have for simplicity we made a tool that efficiently tabulated the been shown to be obfuscatable [29] [56]).
number of unique outputs that are transferred between pro-A more popular way of concealing application instruccedures while an application is run on some input set. From tions is through encryption. Homomorphic encryption these tabulations we can compute the output weight, as schemes [45] [46] allow meaningful computations to be pershown in Fig. 9 where the number of unique outputs out formed on encrypted data, but are not general enough of the inflate-codes () procedure in Gzip are used to de-for practical use. Instead, many have suggested ustermine an output weight of 1(.) =390, 657.
ing a small trusted computing base to decrypt cipherLooking again at our Gzip example, Table IV gives the text applications and to execute instructions confidentially computed output weight of six select procedures from an [3] [22] [32] [38]. This idea of using specialized security hardexecution of Gzip on the small version of the same five input ware and secure coprocessors has seen many manifestations [48] [59], however we believe that this paper two efficient tests that can be used to identify an applicais the first analysis of the problem of code secrecy when tion's susceptibility to a Memoization Attack. These tests considering application operations a whole. Program slic-were implemented efficiently and run on an example appliing has been proposed [60] 
